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Constitutional Rights in the Irish Home Rule Bill of 1893 
TOM ALLEN 
 
Abstract 
In 1893, Prime Minister Gladstone introduced the second Irish home rule bill in parliament. 
The bill broke with tradition in Britain and the empire, as it included provisions from the bill 
of rights of the United States. Its significance was clear at the time: it was debated for nine 
days in the committee stage and, with one minor amendment, it remained part of the bill that 
passed the commons. However, the bill was defeated in the lords and, at least in the United 
Kingdom, bills of rights were dismissed as unnecessary or detrimental to sound governance 
until well after world war two. This article therefore tries to understand how this early bill of 
rights was regarded at the time. Who suggested, or demanded, its inclusion? How did they 
expect it to be applied? And how did the debate reflect and influence thinking about 
constitutional law in Britain and the empire?  
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
The historic opposition of the United Kingdom’s governments to constitutional bills of rights, 
both at home and in the colonies, is well-known. Until the 1960s, British governments 
maintained that bills of rights would either fail to protect rights, or interfere with stable 
governance, or both.1 Before then, rights only appeared in constitutions that were drafted 
                                                 
1 Charles O.H. Parkinson, Bills of Rights and Decolonization, Oxford, 2009; A.W.B. 
Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire, Oxford, 2004, 1-54; Ivor Jennings, The 
Approach to Self Government, Cambridge, 1958, 98-110. 
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locally2 or where the British sought to gain support from groups with specific interests.3 It is 
therefore quite striking that the first two bills introduced for home rule for Ireland, the 
Government of Ireland Bill 1886 and the Government of Ireland Bill 1893, both included 
bills of rights. To be sure, they were not as broad as modern bills of rights, and they only 
applied in respect of laws enacted by the Irish legislature. Nevertheless, the government 
presented them as integral elements of the constitutional proposals. Indeed, the Liberal prime 
minister, William Gladstone, described them as part of new ‘Magna Charta’ for Ireland.4 
The relevant clause of the 1886 bill included guarantees of access to education, 
prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of religion, and protection for bodies incorporated 
outside Ireland. The 1886 bill was defeated in the commons on second reading, and hence 
before a full debate on the clause. The Liberals lost the general election that followed, and 
home rule did not come back to parliament until they returned to power after the 1892 
election. The 1893 bill kept the 1886 provisions, and added a more general right of greater 
significance. In its original form, clause 4(5) of the 1893 bill provided that the Irish 
legislature could not enact laws ‘Whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty or 
                                                 
2 The main examples are the constitution of India, 1947, the constitution of Ireland, 1937 and 
Irish Free State Constitution Act 1922, 13 Geo. V, sess. 2, c. 1 (enacting the Constitution of 
the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann) Act 1922 of the Irish constituent assembly, which is 
considered the authoritative source of the constitution under Irish law); see Parkinson, Bills of 
Rights, 42-50.  
3 For example, the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and the Government of India Act 1935 
contained rights to property, but these rights were not expected to have any real impact on the 
legislatures and were included as concessions to landowning classes: see Tom Allen, The 
Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions, Cambridge, 2000, 41-46. 
4 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, col. 1087, 15 June 1893 (House of Commons).  
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property without due process of law, or may be denied the equal protection of the laws, or 
whereby private property may be taken without just compensation’.5 The clause was 
borrowed from the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution of the United States.6 
The rights were not entirely foreign to Britain: it was widely believed that the framers of the 
                                                 
5 One amendment was accepted in committee, so that the final version of clause prohibited 
laws ‘Whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law in accordance with the settled principles and precedents, or may be denied the equal 
protection of the laws, or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation’. 
(emphasis added). See below, text accompanying n. Error! Bookmark not defined..  
6 United States constitution, 5th amendment: ‘No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.’ 14th amendment, para (1) ‘. . . No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’.  
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constitution took them from the common law constitution.7 However, nothing similar to 
clause 4(5) had previously been incorporated in any colonial constitution.8  
Plainly, the clause could have set constitutional thinking in a different direction if the 
bill had passed into law. The bill did pass the house of commons, but it was defeated by an 
overwhelming majority in the house of lords. However, it is largely missing from accounts of 
historians of Irish home rule and of human rights.9 There are several explanations for this, as 
                                                 
7 See David Schneiderman, ‘A. V. Dicey, Lord Watson, and the Law of the Canadian 
Constitution in the Late Nineteenth Century’, 16 Law and History Review (1998), 495, 504ff, 
for a review of the views of American and British constitutionalists; one example given by 
Schneiderman is Henry Sumner Maine, Popular Government: Four Essays, London, 1885, 
208: ‘the Constitution of the United States is coloured throughout by political ideas of British 
origin, and that it is in reality a version of the British Constitution, as it must have presented 
itself to an observer in the second half of the last century’. 
8 There were provisions on specific aspects of religious discrimination, such as section 93 of 
the British North America Act 1867, 30 Vict., c. 3. 
9 For example, John Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United 
Kingdom Constitution, 1870-1921, Kingston and Montreal, 1989, 75-76, states that the 1893 
bill ‘differed in seven significant ways from the 1886 bill on which it was modelled’, but 
does not mention the rights added by clause 4(5); similar treatment can be seen in Alan 
O’Day, Irish Home Rule 1867-1921, Manchester, 1998; Alvin Jackson, Home Rule, an Irish 
History 1800–2000, Oxford, 2003, 67-106; James Loughlin, Gladstone, Home Rule and the 
Ulster question, 1882-93, Dublin, 1986; Alan J. Ward, ‘Models of Government and Anglo-
Irish Relations’, 20 Albion (1988), 19; Thomas Murray, ‘Socio-Economic Rights Versus 
Social Revolution? Constitution Making in Germany, Mexico and Ireland, 1917–1923’, 24 
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this paper will show. First, the clause did not figure in the bargaining that led up to the 1893 
bill. The government added the rights clauses for tactical purposes: it hoped that it might 
weaken the resistance to home rule amongst the unionists and landowners, and their 
sympathizers in Britain. However, there is no evidence that the unionists or landowners 
demanded the clause, or indeed that its inclusion in the bill increased support for home rule.10 
Moreover, the debate on a constitutional bill of rights was always subordinate to the question 
of home rule. The question of home rule was seen as important to the empire, but the 
question of constitutional bills of rights was not treated as a distinct question.11 As it had no 
obvious influence on subsequent developments, it has largely been overlooked by legal 
historians.12 
                                                                                                                                                        
Social & Legal Studies (2015), 1; Thomas Murray, Contesting Economic and Social Rights in 
Ireland: Constitution, State and Society, 1848-2016, Cambridge, 2016.  
10 This was not the case with the fourth home rule bill: the earl of Wicklow proposed the 
amendment that would become the right to property in the Government of Ireland Act 1920, 
and the government agreed to the amendment after initial doubts: Parliamentary Debates, 
series 5, vol. 43, cols. 44-48, 13 Dec. 1920 (House of Lords). 
11 On the imperial aspects, see: Eugenio Biagini, British Democracy and Irish Nationalism, 
1876–1906, Cambridge, 2007; Paul A. Townend, The Road to Home Rule: Anti-imperialism 
and the Irish National Movement, Madison, Wisconsin, 2016; Kendle, Ireland, 57-58.  
12 Exceptions are Christopher McCrudden, ‘Using Comparative Constitutionalism in Human 
Rights Discourse: Ireland’s Past and Scotland’s Future’, 17 Edinburgh Law Review (2013), 
314, 319-326; Joseph Jaconelli, ‘Human Rights Guarantees and Irish Home Rule’, 25-27 
Irish Jurist N.S. (1990-91) 181; Ronan Keane, ‘Fundamental Rights in Irish Law: A Note on 
the Historical Background’ in James O’Reilly, ed., Human Rights and Constitutional Law: 
Essays in Honour of Brian Walsh, Round Hall Press, 1992, 25-35.  
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A second explanation is simply that the clause never caught the imagination of the 
legal profession and scholars. This was partly because the 1893 bill was never enacted: if it 
had come into force, there would have been a steady stream of case law for lawyers to 
analyse and discuss, and undoubtedly this would have led to further examination of the 
origins of the clause. Of course, home rule did not disappear from British politics. It came 
back into parliament with the Government of Ireland Act 1914,13 the Government of Ireland 
Act 1920,14 the Anglo-Irish treaty of 192115 and Irish Free State Constitution Act 1922,16 but 
none of these reveal any influence from the 1893 bill.17 Neither did anything similar to the 
clause appear in constitutions elsewhere in the empire until after world war two. Even so, one 
might have thought that the debates, on their own, would have provoked a continuing debate 
amongst legal and constitutional scholars.  
The clause may therefore appear unworthy of study, but the amount of time devoted 
to it in the parliamentary debates suggests that the scholarship has not given due weight to the 
views of many contemporary politicians. At the committee stage, the house of commons 
debated the clause for nine days before the government moved to closure. Even the 
corresponding commons debate on the entire Human Rights Bill 1998 was completed in four 
                                                 
13 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 90. 
14 10 & 11 Geo. V, c. 67. 
15 Irish Free State (Agreement) Act 1922 12 & 13 Geo. V, c. 4. 
16 Irish Free State Constitution Act 1922, 13 Geo. V sess. 2, c. 1; enacting the Constitution of 
the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann) Act 1922 of the Irish constituent assembly. Under Irish 
law, the latter is considered the authoritative source of the constitution. 
17 The Government of Ireland Act 1920 did include the right to just compensation: see Allen, 
Right to Property, 41-43. 
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days.18 Decades later, in the debates on the Government of Ireland Bill, 1920, the lord 
chancellor remarked that ‘this particular proposal was singled out for more vehement attack 
than almost anything in the Bill’, and he was only speaking of the guarantees respecting 
property rather than the full clause.19  
This article therefore tries to understand how this early bill of rights was regarded at 
the time. Why did the government add it to the home rule bill, given that no group demanded 
its inclusion? How did the debate reflect and influence thinking about constitutional law in 
Britain and the empire? And why did it become a point where history failed to turn? To 
answer these questions, the article begins with a brief description of the place of bills of 
rights in the imperial system of the nineteenth century, before turning to the inclusion of the 
rights clause in the home rule bills. It traces the origins of the clause to the resolutions of the 
Home Government Association, founded in 1870, where it appears that the inspiration was 
taken from the Catholic Relief Act 1793 and American constitutional provisions. It then 
considers the parliamentary debates on the clause, to get a better sense of how it was 
understood at the time. The opposition attacked the clause as a hollow promise, lacking in 
any real safeguards and certain to be mishandled by the judiciary. Behind its attacks, and the 
government’s responses, lay assumptions about the nature of individual rights in the 
unwritten constitution. In the final sections, it considers the debate on more fundamental 
questions about judicial review, constitutional interpretation and the protection of minorities 
                                                 
18 The committee stage debates in the commons can be found at: Parliamentary Debates, 
series 6, vol. 313, cols. 388-475, 3 June 1998 (House of Commons); Parliamentary Debates, 
series 6, vol. 314, cols. 391-434, 17 June 1998 and cols. 1054-1143, 24 June 1998 (House of 
Commons); Parliamentary Debates, series 6, vol. 315, cols. 534-575, 2 July 1998 (House of 
Commons).  
19 Parliamentary Debates, series 5, vol. 43, col. 46, 13 Dec. 1920 (House of Lords). 
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in a democratic state. From this, it discusses the legacy of the Home Rule Bill 1893 on the 
subsequent history of constitutional rights in the empire and commonwealth. 
 
II. RIGHTS IN THE EMPIRE BEFORE THE HOME RULE BILLS   
 
The inclusion of the rights clauses in the 1886 bill, and especially the 1893 bill, went against 
constitutional practice in Britain and the empire regarding the judicial review of legislation. 
This was demonstrated by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, which was enacted to limit 
the scope of judicial review.20 It followed an opinion given in 1863 by the colonial secretary, 
who confirmed that the courts could declare colonial legislation void for repugnancy to the 
fundamental law of England.21 Fundamental law included ‘those essential principles of what 
may be called natural jurisprudence, which, as modified by the ideas and institutions of 
Christianity, have been adopted as the foundation of the existing law of England’.22 The 
colonial secretary’s opinion included advice from the law officers, who stated that colonial 
legislation would only conflict with fundamental law in exceptional cases. A law would not, 
                                                 
20 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63. 
21 The leading contemporary treatise was Alpheus Todd, Parliamentary Government in the 
British Colonies, Boston, 1880, 137-161. See also D.B. Swinfen, Imperial Control of 
Colonial Legislation, 1813-1865, Oxford, 1970; Robert Leckey, Bills of Rights in the 
Common Law, Cambridge, 2015, 56-59; Anne Twomey, ‘Fundamental Common Law 
Principles as Limitations upon Legislative Power’, 9 Oxford University Commonwealth Law 
Journal (2009), 47, 57-60. 
22 ‘South Australia’, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1862) (3048) xxxvii 113, 
180. I eventually found this and have inserted a full reference. I think too your quote is 
at p.181. Do check and see if that is so. 
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for example, violate fundamental law solely because it abolished grand juries, or altered the 
rules of evidence, or introduced ‘modes of transferring real property unknown to British 
law’.23 The opinion and advice were intended to narrow the scope of judicial review, as there 
were signs that colonial judges might make extensive use of the repugnancy doctrine.24 Even 
so, it was too broad for parliament. The 1865 Act limited judicial review to laws that were 
inconsistent with imperial legislation; repugnancy to fundamental law, however narrowly 
defined, was no longer a ground for review.  
The 1865 Act did not leave colonial legislatures with unlimited power over 
individuals, as colonial governors and the privy council were able to delay or deny effect to 
laws that appeared to conflict with constitutional values.25 Both before and after the 1886 bill, 
British governments preferred to rely on these executive mechanisms for controlling colonial 
legislatures. Indeed, the British North America Act 1867 did not incorporate a general bill of 
rights, but it did give the Canadian government the powers of disallowance and reservation 
                                                 
23 Ibid. The law officers also stated that a rule of English law would not be fundamental 
unless it applied to ‘all Her Majesty’s Christian subjects in every part of the British 
dominions’.  
24 The opinion and advice responded to a petition from the South Australian legislature for 
the removal of Justice Benjamin Boothby of the supreme court of South Australia, who had 
refused to apply a number of South Australian Acts on the basis that they conflicted with 
fundamental law. The papers relating to the Boothby case are found in ‘South Australia. 
Correspondence between the Governor of South Australia and the Secretary of State, relative 
to Mr. Justice Boothby’, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1862) (3048) xxxvii 
113. See also Todd, Parliamentary Government, 846-854; Enid Campbell, ‘Colonial 
Legislation and the Laws of England’, 2 University of Tasmania Law Review (1965), 148. 
25 See the authorities cited above, n. 21. 
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over provincial laws.26 Sir John A. Macdonald, Canada's first prime minister, stated that 
Canada would act against provincial laws that were unconstitutional, by which he meant laws 
that were contrary to the fundamental law of England.27 The view therefore seemed to be that 
the imperial system did incorporate a fundamental law, which probably included individual 
rights of some description, but that it would be realized through executive channels rather 
than the courts.  
By the time of the first home rule bill, fears over the impact of the expansion of the 
franchise and the redistribution of parliamentary seats led to increased interest in the 
American constitutional model. If nothing else, it suggested that greater democracy need not 
lead to socialism or disorder. Several writers identified the constitutional protection of 
individual rights as a significant moderating factor in American politics. Sir Henry Sumner 
Maine stated that there was ‘no more important provision’ in the constitution of the United 
States than the contracts clause, because ‘it is the bulwark of American individualism against 
democratic impatience and Socialistic fantasy’.28 Furthermore, the clause made it practically 
                                                 
26 British North America Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c.3, ss. 55-57, 90; note that there were 
specific restrictions in respect of legislation affecting education (s. 93) and language (s. 133). 
27 Referred to by E.A. Forsey, ‘Disallowance of Provincial Acts, Reservation of Provincial 
Bills, and Refusal of Assent by Lieutenant-Governors since 1867’, 4 Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science (1938), 47, 49; see also Webb v Outrim [1907] AC 81, pp. 
88-89, where the earl of Halsbury expressed a similar view of 'unconstitutional' and 'ultra 
vires' legislation.  
28 Maine, Popular Government, 247. The contracts clause is found in USA constitution, 
article I, section 10: ‘No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts’. 
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impossible for ‘certain communistic schemes of American origin’ to be realised in the United 
States.29 In 1886, in respect of the contracts clause, A.V. Dicey claimed that  
If any principle of the like kind had been recognised in England as legally binding on 
the Courts, the Irish Land Act would have been unconstitutional and void; the Irish 
Church Act, 1869, would, in great part at least, have been from a legal point of view 
so much waste paper, and there would have been great difficulty in legislating in the 
way in which the English Parliament has legislated for the reform of the 
Universities.30  
There was therefore a view that judicial review for the protection of individual rights could 
act as a check on radical legislation.31 Of course, it was a separate question whether 
constitutional supremacy would be preferable to parliamentary supremacy or executive 
review. Dicey, in particular, argued the American emphasis on constitutional supremacy and 
federalism would weaken the United Kingdom.32 The colonial practice followed a similar 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 248. 
30 A.V. Dicey, ‘Federal Government’, 1 Law Quarterly Review (1885), 80, 97; see also A.V. 
Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 1st ed., London, 
1885, 160. The Irish Church Act 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 42, disestablished the Irish church 
and abolished the remaining tithes, with compensation for the affected clergy.  
31 Edmund Robertson, a Liberal MP, raised the importance of the extension of the bills of 
rights to the states by the fourteenth amendment. He observed that state laws that were struck 
down under the contracts and due process clauses bore ‘a strong likeness to measures now 
before Parliament or already passed into law’: Edmund Robertson, American Home Rule: A 
Sketch of the Political System of the United States, Edinburgh, 1887, 82. 
32 Alfred Venn Dicey, A Fool's Paradise: Being a Constitutionalist's Criticism on the Home 
Rule Bill of 1912, London, 1913, 95-97. 
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line, as United Kingdom governments became increasingly reluctant to exercise their review 
powers for colonial legislatures with responsible government. In effect, it was assumed that 
the dominions would progress to a version of parliamentary supremacy.33  
III THE ORIGINS OF THE IRISH RIGHTS CLAUSES 
 
The immediate movement to the first home rule bill began in December 1885, when 
Gladstone’s son told a journalist that his father had been ‘converted’ to home rule.34 Prior to 
this, neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals had indicated any support for home rule. The 
question had, of course, been part of public discussion in Ireland and across the United 
Kingdom and the wider empire for many decades. Positions ranged from campaigns for 
complete independence, to the repeal of the Act of Union 1800 and the restoration of an 
independent Irish parliament, to home rule under some form of federal association within the 
United Kingdom, to the devolution of some aspects of public administration but without a 
separate legislature. When Gladstone’s son made his announcement, neither Salisbury’s 
Conservatives nor the Liberals commanded a majority and Charles Parnell’s Irish 
Parliamentary Party (IPP) held the balance of power. The IPP had initially supported 
                                                 
33 In 1907, James Bryce, now ambassador to the United States, told an American audience 
that colonial legislation was ‘scarcely ever’ vetoed, and only ‘in those extremely few cases in 
which some law passed by the colony may conflict with the interests of some other part of the 
British empire, or where it would conflict with some international obligation under taken by 
treaty’. James Bryce, ‘Some Difficulties in Colonial Government Encountered by Great 
Britain and How They Have Been Met’, (1907) 30 American Colonial Policy and 
Administration (1907), 16, 17-18.  
34 O’Day, Irish Home Rule, 92-121; Loughlin, Gladstone, 35-52.  
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Salisbury, but they joined the Liberals in defeating the government on a vote of confidence in 
January 1886. Gladstone quickly formed a new government and began work on a home rule 
bill. 
The origins of the clause can be traced to Isaac Butt and the Home Government 
Association, which he founded in 1870. Under Butt’s leadership, the association approached 
home rule as a conservative project. It was largely driven by the Protestant professional and 
commercial elite that believed that it had been abandoned by the disestablishment of the Irish 
church, and that it could manage issues relating to land tenure, education, religion and 
unlawful protest far better than the United Kingdom Parliament.35 Butt, and other members of 
the association, recognized that many Protestants believed that home rule posed a greater risk 
to them than the Act of Union. There was, for example, a concern that a Catholic majority 
would challenge the confiscations of Catholic property that followed the civil war. The 
association sought to assure the public that these concerns were unfounded: in an open letter 
to ‘the People of Ireland’, published September 17th, 1870, it stated that ‘We cannot too 
                                                 
35 Church of Ireland Act 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 42, which took effect in 1871. See J.J. 
Golden, ‘The Protestant Influence on the Origins of Irish Home Rule, 1861–1871’, 128 (535) 
English Historical Review (2013), 1483; Colin Reid, 'An Experiment in Constructive 
Unionism: Isaac Butt, Home Rule and Federalist Political Thought during the 1870s’, 129 
(537) English Historical Review (2014), 332; Lawrence J. McCaffrey, ‘Isaac Butt and the 
Home Rule Movement: A Study in Conservative Nationalism’, 22 The Review of Politics 
(1960), 72. See also Rev. Thadeus O’Malley, Home Rule on the Basis of Federalism, 
London, 1873, 92: O’Malley was a Catholic priest and a member of the association; he 
acknowledged that some Catholics saw home rule as a Protestant Tory movement, and said 
‘For my part, I rejoice especially at the prospect of this movement quickly embracing the 
great bulk of the Conservative party in Ireland’. 
14 
 
strongly or too emphatically disclaim any purpose or object of any religious ascendancy or 
any attack upon the property or rights of any one’.36 The association deliberately did not go 
into detail of a proposed constitution, but it did say that it was open to specific guarantees: 
‘We invite any of our countrymen who may have the most remote apprehension of danger 
from the Irish parliament to their religion, their liberty, or their property, to suggest any 
guarantees, to be made an inviolable part of the constitution which we seek’.37 As 
suggestions, it stated that its members would assent to guarantees similar to the American 
constitutional guarantees that ‘religious equality shall forever be preserved’, or, closer to 
home, to ‘the provision so often inserted in the oaths imposed on the Irish people that the 
existing settlement of property should never be disturbed’.38 The second suggestion recalled 
the Catholic Relief Act 1793, which allowed Catholics to vote if they held land to the value 
of forty shillings, and if they swore to ‘defend to the utmost of my power the settlement and 
arrangement of property in this country, as established by the laws now in being’.39 The 
                                                 
36 ‘Address of the Home Government Association. To the People of Ireland.’ Dublin Weekly 
Nation. 17 Sept. 1870, 71. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Home Rule League, Proceedings of the Home Rule Conference held at the Rotunda, 
Dublin, on the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st November, 1873, Dublin, 1874, 33-34 (Isaac Butt). 
The Catholic Relief Act 1829, 10 Geo. IV. c. 7, s. 2, continued the requirement of the oath, 
including the commitment not to challenge the settlement of property. The Parliamentary 
Oaths Act 1866, 29 & 30 Vict., c. 19, s. 1 abolished the separate Catholic oath in favour 
single oath of allegiance. 
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reference in the oath to the ‘settlement and arrangement of property’ was a response to 
Protestant fears of a reversal of the confiscations of property following the civil war.40 
The association left these questions open for suggestion and discussion. In Butt’s own 
pamphlet, Home Government for Ireland: Irish Federalism! Its Meaning, Its Objects, and Its 
Hopes, first published in 1870, he suggested that Protestant objections might be overcome if 
an Irish parliament were denied the power to legislate for the ‘the establishment of any 
religious ascendancy, or any alteration of the Act which settled Irish property in the reign of 
Charles II’.41 John George MacCarthy, in his A Plea for the Home Government of Ireland, 
stated that ‘If deemed desirable, however, it might be arranged that the establishment of any 
religious ascendency, or the alteration of the Acts which settled Irish property in the reign of 
Charles II, should be placed beyond its jurisdiction’.42 Similarly, Thaddeus O’Malley, a 
Catholic priest who joined the association, cited the ‘noble general assuring clauses’ of the 
                                                 
40 See Greg Taylor, ‘Two Refusals of Royal Assent in Victoria’, 29 Sydney Law Review 
(2007), 85, 89-92, referring to the debates on the Parliamentary Oaths Act 1866, where 
Rickard Deasy, a Liberal MP who would later join the Irish court of appeal, explained that 
the clause was introduced in 1793 ‘obviously with the intention of guarding against the 
danger of Roman Catholics proposing a repeal of the Act of Settlement, which was passed in 
the reign of Charles II, and which regulated the distribution of landed property after the 
convulsion of the civil war. Everyone knew that, at that time, there was a real danger of such 
a proposition. … the Protestant Legislature, in 1793, thought it necessary to enact a special 
security against a renewal of it’: 21 Parliamentary Debates, series 3, vol. 145, col. 1763, 15 
June 1857 (House of Commons).  
41 Isaac Butt, Home Government for Ireland: Irish Federalism! Its Meaning, Its Objects, and 
Its Hopes, 3rd ed., Dublin, 1871, 53.  
42 John George MacCarthy, A Plea for the Home Government of Ireland, London, 1871, 14. 
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bill of rights and stated that ‘Twill be the simplest thing in the world to transfer into our great 
Federal act almost every one of these sundry provisions’.43 No decision was taken at this 
point but, crucially, the debate was already framed as one of tactics: there was no suggestion 
from Butt, O’Malley or the association in its open letter that constitutional guarantees should 
lie at the heart of a home rule scheme, or that they would be needed to restrain the Catholic 
majority. They were only valued as concessions that might help win over a group that would 
have resisted constitutional change.44 This emphasis on tactics, as subsequent developments 
would show, set the debate through the first two home rule bills and even the third bill of 
1912.  
In 1873, the association convened the Home Rule Conference, from which the Home 
Rule League was formed. The conference adopted a set of principles that largely followed the 
Home Government Association’s resolutions, with guarantees now incorporated as 
Resolution VIII: 
That while we believe that in an Irish parliament the rights and liberties of all classes 
of our countrymen would find their best and surest protection, we are willing that 
there should be incorporated in the federal constitution articles supplying the amplest 
guarantees that no change shall be made by parliament in the present settlement of 
property in Ireland, and that no legislation shall be adopted to establish any religious 
                                                 
43 O’Malley, Home Rule, 80; O’Malley’s suggestion went as far as including the restrictions 
on an imperial parliament, in the same way that the Bill of Rights restrained congress. 
44 See A.M. Sullivan, New Ireland, Philadelphia, 1878, 466-467, for the resolutions of the 
Home Government Association. 
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ascendancy in Ireland or to subject any person to disabilities on account of his 
religious opinions.45 
In his opening speech to the conference, Butt reprised the open letter by tracing the clause 
back to the oath required by the Catholic Relief Act 1793. Butt acknowledged that it was 
‘almost childish’ to think that restraints on a Catholic majority would be needed more than 
two centuries after the Act of Settlement: not only would the Irish parliament be constituted 
so as to favour propertied interests, but Catholics were no longer disabled from holding land 
and therefore had a stake in maintaining the existing order.46 Nevertheless,  
prejudices remain long after the cause that excited them has passed away, and if there 
be a person in Ireland who fears that an Irish parliament would pass, with the assent 
of the House of Lords and the Sovereign, an act interfering, on any pretence, with the 
title to his estate, I see no objection to the insertion of such a guarantee.47  
To any objections that such guarantees would be ignored, Butt replied that the Irish 
legislature would need the consent of the imperial parliament to override the restrictions.48  
The conference ultimately passed the resolution, but it was clear that it was seen as a 
purely tactical measure and was evaluated on that basis. For example, William Archer 
Redmond argued that it would ‘take away from their enemies and opponents any excuse for 
                                                 
45 ‘Resolutions of National Conference’, in Home Rule League, Proceedings, 202; see 
generally, David Thornley, Isaac Butt and Home Rule, London, 1964, 160-169. 
46 Home Rule League, Proceedings, 34. Note O’Malley’s recognition of the value of winning 
over the Protestant Tories: ‘The vast preponderance of the wealth of the country, and of its 
cultivated intelligence, and its manufacturing and commercial industry, is Protestant and 
Conservative; to win all that to the popular cause, what a gain!’ O’Malley, Home Rule, 93. 
47 Home Rule League, Proceedings, 34.  
48 Ibid., 35. 
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relying upon the false grounds upon which their opposition had hitherto been based, so that 
they might meet them face to face upon the real merits of the case’.49 He also considered 
voters and politicians outside Ireland: once they saw that the home rulers had no designs on 
property or religious freedom, they would give it their support.50 Others were more grudging 
in their support, as the connection with the Catholic oaths seemed to give legitimacy to the 
prejudices of the Protestant community. J. Martin said the resolution left him ‘feeling 
humiliation for his countrymen, for the Irish nation, and with a bitter feeling of humiliation 
for himself as a Protestant and a member of the Protestant community’.51 Nevertheless, he 
backed it  
because it seems to be required by a great number of my Protestant fellow-
countrymen – because it is expected that our fellow-countrymen will have all their 
fears removed when such a guarantee as this is offered them – a guarantee the 
strength of which they cannot doubt, seeing that the whole power of England, the 
whole power of the English empire, will be arrayed against Ireland if Ireland attempts 
to violate it.52  
Some delegates rejected the resolution entirely. Canon McDermott attacked it as ‘degrading’ 
and ‘self-accusing’. Tactically, it was unwise, because ‘a guarantee against mere visionary 
fears’ would not swing any of their opponents to their side.53 If anything, it would justify 
opposition to home rule, as it would be seen as proof that an Irish parliament ‘could sink so 
low as to become a den of thieves and a conclave of robbers.’  
                                                 
49 Ibid., 141. 
50 Ibid., 143. 
51 Ibid., 161. 
52 Ibid., 43. 
53 Ibid., 156. 
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It was clear that Butt had made a serious tactical error in linking the resolution back to 
the Catholic oaths. The separate oath had only been abolished in 1866;54 to suggest that a 
substitute might be needed to keep the Irish in check alienated potential supporters amongst 
the Catholic population. Indeed, Charles Gavan Duffy, the founder of the Tenant Right 
League and later premier of Victoria, said in 1857 that he ‘had felt his face grow hot with 
very shame — to make a declaration that he would not commit a crime of the greatest 
magnitude’ as a condition of taking a seat in the Victoria legislature.55 It seemed possible that 
McDermott’s speech would lead to the defeat of the resolution, but Butt managed to recover 
the situation. He went back to the second potential source of guarantees that were mentioned 
by the Home Government Association in its open letter of 1870.56 Butt told the conference 
that the resolution was suggested to him ‘some time ago’ by a ‘Protestant gentleman’ who 
was ‘earnestly devoted to the cause of Home Rule’. The gentleman, whom he did not 
identify, referred him to the American provisions. This persuaded Butt to support the 
resolution:  
he found in the American constitution a similar provision, though not exactly in the 
same words; and the constitution of several of the American States gave more 
stringent provisions against any act of the legislature adverse to religious liberty or the 
                                                 
54 Parliamentary Oaths Act 1866, 29 & 30 Vict., c. 19, s. 1. See generally Mark Anthony 
Frassetto, ‘Catholic Emancipation: 1760-1829’, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2198549> accessed 28 March 2018. 
55 Printed in Taylor, ‘Two Refusals’, 94 n. 36.  
56 Above, n. 36. 
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rights of property; and what Washington, and Henry, and Jefferson had assented to, he 
(Mr. Butt) did not think could be held to humiliate the Conference.57  
Finally, the resolution could be defended as a matter of principle. It represented a lasting 
commitment to freedom: he told the conference that ‘they were not now legislating … for to-
day, or to-morrow, or for ten or twenty years. They were endeavouring to frame a 
constitution that would be perpetual’; 58 this provision would ensure that the Irish legislators 
would not depart from freedom, unlike England and the Irish Protestants. At the same time, it 
incorporated flexibility, as the Irish and imperial parliaments could abrogate the provision by 
agreement.  
Ultimately, the conference adopted the resolution. However, under Charles Parnell, 
the IPP shifted away from Butt’s conservativism, and his Proposed Constitution of October 
1885 did not include a rights clause.59 It seems that he was persuaded by McDermott’s 
argument: the suggestion that Catholics could not be trusted might cost the IPP more amongst 
its Catholic supporters than it would ever gain amongst Protestant unionists or the electorate 
outside Ireland. In the debates on the 1893 bill, none of the IPP members spoke in favour of 
the clause, as they saw the legislature as the guarantor of individual freedoms.60 The 
dominant view was expressed by Duffy in an article in the Contemporary Review stating that 
‘a perfect, and perhaps the only perfect, guarantee’ for minorities would be the conferral of 
                                                 
57 Home Rule League, Proceedings of the Home Rule Conference, 165; Butt did not identify 
the ‘similar provision’.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Printed in J.L. Hammond, Gladstone and the Irish Nation, London, 1938, 422.  
60 See e.g. Clancy, Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, cols. 1213-15, 16 June 1893 
(House of Commons); Sexton, Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, cols. 1216-18, 16 
June 1893 (House of Commons).  
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power on an Irish legislature and executive as extensive as the power held by the Canadian 
and Australian legislatures.61 He was in favour of special safeguards, but in the form of 
representation: ‘I am for guarantees which will make the Parliament of Ireland a fair image of 
the whole people; not of this or that section, but of all’.62 He also argued that the withholding 
of royal assent would also provide an important check on rash legislation, although he did not 
discuss the grounds on which assent should be withheld.63 Hence, he was in favour of 
constructing the legislative and executive power in a way that protected individual rights, but 
without recommending justiciable rights on the American model.64 To be sure, there were 
still some home rulers who saw some value in guarantees: in a memorandum written for 
                                                 
61 C. Gavan Duffy, ‘A Fair Constitution for Ireland’, 52 The Contemporary Review (1887), 
301, 305-306. 
62 C. Gavan Duffy, ‘Mr. Gladstone’s Irish Constitution’, 49 The Contemporary Review 
(1886), 609, 618.  
63 Duffy, ‘A Fair Constitution’, 315-316. In both articles, Duffy said that the provisions for 
the protection of minorities under the United States constitution were effective, but preferred 
safeguards that concentrated on legislative and executive controls. For example, in ‘A Fair 
Constitution’, at 318-319, he discussed the American provisions on religion, but 
recommending adapting the provision of the ‘Canadian Constitution’ requiring legislation 
affecting religion to be laid before parliament (the provision was first enacted as section 42 of 
the Constitutional Act of the Province of Lower Canada, 1791, 31 Geo. III, c. 31, but was not 
carried forward to the British North America Act 1867). 
64 Duffy argued for ‘guarantees’, but did not see them as individual rights protected by 
judicial review; his examples of guarantees related to a common sovereign, ‘complete 
religious equality’, an independent court to resolve constitutional issues, and guarantees for 
compensation of MPs: see ‘A Fair Constitution’, 318-320.  
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Gladstone in 1885, James Bryce, the regius professor of civil law at Oxford and a Liberal 
member of parliament,65 said that Michael Davitt, a prominent home rule campaigner,66 had 
suggested that clauses for the protection of property and religious minorities could make 
home rule palatable to some of its opponents.67 Nevertheless, Bryce reported that Davitt still 
saw it purely as a gesture to the Protestants, rather than a matter of higher constitutional 
principle. Moreover, Bryce said that the unionists that he spoke with dismissed the idea out of 
hand. As McDermott had predicted, guarantees would mean little to those who were 
implacably opposed to home rule in any form.68 In any case, by the 1893 debates in 
parliament, the IPP members were firmly of Duffy’s view: legislative power would provide a 
safeguard for minorities, rather than a threat to them.69 Ultimately, for the IPP, the protection 
of individual rights never moved beyond a concession that should only be made if necessary 
to gain enough support to secure home rule.  
                                                 
65 John T. Seaman, A Citizen of the World: The Life of James Bryce, London, New York, 
2006. 
66 D. George Boyce, ‘Davitt, Michael (1846–1906)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2008; 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32747>, accessed 8 April 2017. 
67 James Bryce, ‘Irish Opinion on the Irish Problem: Memorandum’, 11 Dec. 1885, Gladstone 
Papers, British Library, Add MS 44770, 5-14. 
68 Indeed, as explained below, Bryce himself rejected guarantees in an article he wrote in 
1886: see text accompanying n. 96. He did not express his reservations in his memorandum 
to Gladstone. 
69 See e.g. Clancy, Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, cols. 1213-15, 16 June 1893 
(House of Commons); Sexton, Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, cols. 1216-18, 16 
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IV GLADSTONE AND THE DRAFTING OF THE BILLS 
 
Gladstone drafted the 1886 home rule bill in secrecy, but he would have known about the 
discussions of the Home Government Association meetings and the Home Rule Conference, 
as well as Bryce’s description of Davitt’s views. He was aware of the divisions within his 
own party, and would have hoped that he could reduce the number of defections that might 
follow its introduction. It is speculation but, like William Archer Redmond, Gladstone may 
have hoped that a rights clause would sway opinion amongst voters outside Ireland. When he 
introduced the bill in parliament, Gladstone stated that the provision of ‘safeguards for the 
minority’ was one of its five ‘essential conditions’.70 Gladstone identified three groups that 
would need protection under home rule: the first was ‘the class immediately connected with 
the land’ (the landlords, rather than the tenants or labourers); the second ‘relates to the Civil 
Service and the offices of the Executive Government in Ireland’; and the third the ‘Protestant 
minority’, especially in Ulster.71 Several clauses specifically protected the second group;72 for 
the first and third, the safeguards were distributed across the bill. For the landlords, they were 
found mainly in provisions regarding the franchise and composition of the legislature. The 
                                                 
70 The other conditions on home rule were: ‘first, that it must be consistent with Imperial 
unity; secondly, that it must be founded upon the political equality of the three nations; 
thirdly, that there must be an equitable distribution of Imperial burdens; fourthly, that there 
should be safeguards for the minority; and, fifthly, that it should be in the nature of a 
settlement, and not of a mere provocation to the revival of fresh demands.’ Parliamentary 
Debates, series 3, vol. 304, col. 1536, 13 April 1886 (House of Commons); see also 
Parliamentary Debates, series 3, vol. 304 cols. 1051-52, 8 April 1886 (House of Commons).  
71 Parliamentary Debates, series 3, vol. 304, col. 1052, 8 April 1886 (House of Commons). 
72 Clauses 27-30. 
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legislature would be unicameral, but comprised of two ‘orders’.73 The first would include the 
twenty-eight Irish representative peers and a further seventy members to be elected by a 
restricted franchise; the second would comprise over two hundred members elected by a 
wider franchise. 74 The two orders could vote separately on a bill; if they disagreed, the bill 
did not pass. However, after three years, the legislature could pass it by simple majority.75 As 
a final safeguard, the bill allowed the imperial parliament to enact laws that were beyond the 
powers of the Irish legislature, or to specifically override Irish legislation.76 The lord 
lieutenant would also have the power to veto specific legislation.77  
For the third category, the bill included a number of restrictions on the legislature, in 
clause 4:  
4. The Irish Legislature shall not make any law — 
(1.) Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or  
(2.) Imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, on account of religious 
belief; or  
(3.) Abrogating or derogating from the right to establish or maintain any place of 
denominational education or any denominational institution or charity; or  
                                                 
73 Clauses 9-11. 
74 Clauses 9-11. 
75 Clauses 9(2) and 23. 
76 Clause 39; see also clause 37; controversially, under clause 24, the Irish MPs would lose 
their seats in the ‘ordinary’ parliament. 
77 Clause 7(2); see Jaconelli, ‘Human Rights’, 185-188 and McCrudden, ‘Using Comparative 
Constitutionalism’, 322-323 on these political safeguards. 
25 
 
(4.) Prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a school receiving public 
money without attending the religious instruction at that school; or  
(5.) Impairing, without either the leave of Her Majesty in Council first obtained on an 
address presented by the Legislative Body of Ireland, or the consent of the corporation 
interested, the rights, property, or privileges of any existing corporation incorporated 
by royal charter or local and general Act of Parliament. 
Paragraphs (1) to (4) of clause 4 addressed fears that an Irish legislature would act against 
Protestant interests. They were not novel: the ‘conscience clause’ had been part of education 
policies from the 1830s, and would be part of the later home rule bills and the Irish 
constitutions of 1922 and 1937.78 Paragraph (5) served two purposes. In respect of public 
utilities and municipal corporations, it assured lenders in England and elsewhere that the new 
legislature would not enact laws to extinguish a corporation’s debts. In respect of Trinity 
College Dublin and Protestant religious corporations, it protected their assets from new 
legislature.79 
As the bill was defeated before committee stage, the consideration of the clause was 
limited. By this time, Joseph Chamberlain and Sir George Otto Trevelyan had resigned from 
Gladstone’s cabinet and formed the Liberal Unionist party. Ultimately, over ninety former 
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Liberal MPs would vote with the Conservatives to defeat the bill on second reading.80 
Despite the truncated nature of the debate, there is some indication of the main objections of 
the opposition. They agreed that the minorities in Ireland did need safeguards, but that only 
parliament could provide them; as Salisbury put it, the real issue was ‘whether the minority in 
Ireland is treated fairly or not, whether the elementary rights of property are observed, 
whether contracts are upheld, or whether a new and sinister ascendancy is established. Those 
things depend entirely on whether you reserve power in the last resort—power, real, practical, 
efficacious—in the hands of the British Parliament’.81 There were comments that, simply by 
recognizing that safeguards would be needed, the government had shown that the Catholic 
majority could not be trusted and home rule would not work.82 As a related point, some MPs 
argued that the judicial process would be too complex. The bill would have made the judicial 
committee of the privy council the final court of appeal for constitutional questions and the 
house of lords for all other disputes; according to some, this would create crippling conflicts 
in jurisdiction.83  
                                                 
80 O’Day, Irish Home Rule, 107-117; on the divisions amongst Liberals leading to the split, 
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secession’, in D. George Boyce and Alan O’Day, eds., Gladstone and Ireland: Politics, 
Religion and Nationality in the Victorian Age, Basingstone, 2010, 65-85.  
81 Parliamentary Debates, series 3, vol. 306, cols. 1278-79, 10 June 1886 (House of Lords). 
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Gladstone resigned on the defeat of the bill. In the general election that followed, 
Salisbury’s Conservatives were able to form a government with the support of the Liberal 
Unionists.84 In the 1892 election, the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists held a minority, 
but Salisbury continued in power until defeated on a vote of no confidence in August 1892. 
Gladstone then formed a government with support from the IPP. He immediately called 
together a drafting committee comprising himself and five other cabinet members to prepare 
a new home rule bill.85 The resulting bill borrowed extensively from the 1886 version, with a 
few changes to Irish representation in parliament and the composition and structure of Irish 
legislature. In Gladstone’s introductory speech, he made it clear that the five ‘essential 
                                                                                                                                                        
cols. 406-410, 28 May 1886 (House of Commons). Under clause 19 of the 1893 bill, the UK  
would have appointed two judges of the Irish supreme court as exchequer judges, with 
jurisdiction over matters not within the powers of the Irish legislature, and hence over the 
constitutionality of Irish legislation; appeals would be heard by the judicial committee of the 
privy council. Dicey argued that the new clause did not resolve the jurisdictional confusion, 
and in any case the judgments of the exchequer judges would be ignored in Ireland: A.V. 
Dicey, A Leap in the Dark or Our New Constitution, London, 1893. 
84 The Conservatives won 317 seats to the 191 seats for the Liberals and 85 for the IPP; with 
the support of the 77 Liberal Unionists, Salisbury formed a government and held power 
through to the 1892 general election. 
85 John Morley (chief secretary of the Irish Office), Earl Spencer (lord lieutenant of Ireland), 
Lord Herschell (lord chancellor), Sir Henry Bannerman-Campbell (secretary of state for war 
and a former chief secretary of the Irish Office), James Bryce (chancellor of the duchy of 
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conditions’ of the 1886 bill also applied to the new bill.86 The key development, in terms of 
safeguarding minorities, lay in the addition of the rights to due process, equal protection and 
just compensation in clause 4(5).87  
Except for the references to a ‘Magna Charta for Ireland’ and the protection of 
minorities as an ‘essential condition’ of the bill, Gladstone’s opening speech did not offer any 
explanation for the inclusion of the new clause 4(5) in the bill.  Indeed, it does not appear 
                                                 
86 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 8, col. 1250, 13 Feb. 1893 (House of Commons); see 
above, n. 70. 
87 The other addition was clause 4(7), barring the legislature from enacting laws depriving 
any inhabitant of the United Kingdom of ‘equal rights as respects public sea fisheries’. 
Clause 34(1) added a three-year moratorium on legislation affecting landlord-tenant relations 
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that, prior to the introduction of the bill in parliament, there was any public discussion in 
Liberal circles about incorporating the new rights in a home rule bill.88 For example, the 
National Liberal Federation supported home rule in its Newcastle conference in 1891, but 
there is no record of any discussion of such a clause or the value of a bill of rights generally, 
even though the conference resolutions formed the basis of the Liberal campaign in 1892. As 
explained above, the trend was one of indifference or opposition to justiciable bills of rights; 
executive forms of review would protect individuals in the colonies, with due sensitivity to 
wide political factors. Nevertheless, there were tactical reasons to expand the 1886 clause. In 
Britain, most intellectuals were already opposed to home rule,89 as were many prominent 
newspapers and periodicals.90 As Gladstone could not afford another round of defections, he 
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may have thought the clause would persuade any wavering supporters that home rule would 
not threaten minorities. This also seems to have been the view of James Bryce. He was a 
member of Gladstone’s drafting committee for the bill and, although he did not claim any 
personal responsibility for the due process clause, it was widely believed that he drafted it.91 
It was taken from the constitution of the United States, and Bryce was the leading British 
expert on the American constitutional system, having published a lengthy treatise, American 
Commonwealth, in 1888.92 As noted below, it is not clear that he believed that it would 
provide a real safeguard.93 However, he did recognize its tactical value, as seen in his speech 
in the commons defending the clause: 
We considered the points where protection [of minorities] was thought to be 
necessary, and we found two subjects with regard to which it was said unjust 
legislation was possible, and proper protection was needed; and, without supposing 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1989), 18. The clause did not seem to make a difference to the British news media: editorials 
regularly repeated the arguments made in parliament against the clause, and played even 
more openly on the mistrust of the Irish and of Gladstone’s tactics. See, for example: The 
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91 Sir George Bartley adverted to this in parliament: Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, 
col.  1082, 15 June 1893 (House of Commons).  
92 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, London, New York, 1888.  
93 See below text accompanying n. 96.  
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those conclusions were well-founded, we desired to meet them as far as possible. 
Those two were religion and property.94  
Bryce recognized that there were concerns that an Irish legislature might abuse its power, and 
yet he was careful not to alienate the IPP by suggesting that these concerns had any 
substance.  
There is therefore some evidence that the clause was inserted for tactical reasons. 
Moreover, similar considerations suggest why Bryce turned to the American constitutional 
texts for the language for the clause: as Butt found at the Home Rule Conference, the 
American model avoided the negative associations of the old Catholic oaths. This is 
supported by Bryce’s own shifts in opinion.95 He initially dismissed the value of rights in his 
1886 paper ‘Alternative Politics in Ireland’.96 It was not that he rejected the need for 
safeguards, especially for the landlords. As he put it, they could not be left to the ‘mercy of 
an Irish authority’, even though the ‘sins of the class in time past’ had cost them some of their 
support in England. Some landlords were innocent of any wrongdoing: ‘ladies, for instance, 
with no livelihood save from their rents’ had already suffered from legislation that allowed 
for judicial adjustment of rents. He said that Irish nationalists regarded the landlords as 
‘robbers’ and would authorize compulsory purchase of their estates at nominal 
                                                 
94 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, col.  1106, 15 June 1893 (House of 
Commons). Bryce did not refer to the protection of life and liberty, although they were 
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compensation.97 Bryce was also concerned that abandoning the landlords in Ireland would 
undermine the security of property in England and Scotland. Nothing less than national 
honour was at stake: ‘We could not look other nations in the face were we to throw over men 
whose property we confirmed as lately as by the Act of 1881’.98 Nevertheless, he dismissed 
the value of justiciable rights, for two reasons. First, he said that ‘such guarantees would not 
touch the police difficulty’.99 The ‘police difficulty’ referred to the claim that, even if the 
courts did uphold the guarantees, the executive would ignore their judgments and the 
devolution of power would make it impossible for the British government to take effective 
action to require compliance.100 Secondly, he said that guarantees ‘would be uncertain in their 
effect, likely to give rise to infinite litigation, [and] certain to produce conflicts between any 
Irish authority and imperial statutes’.101 As discussed below, Bryce would take a different 
view in the 1893 debates. Bryce’s correspondence offers no explanation for his shifting 
opinion, so it is possible he was simply responding to instructions from Gladstone when he 
drafted the clause. Or, like Gladstone, he may have thought that it was worth pursuing any 
measure that might help to secure votes.  
It is, of course, possible that Bryce felt that the clause would provide an important 
addition to the home rule bill. In this regard, it is worth noting that the clause incorporated the 
right to due process, whereas earlier suggestions had only concerned rights to equality, 
religion and just compensation. This provided a response to Salisbury’s policies for dealing 
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with the ‘Irish question’. Salisbury believed that unrest could be brought to an end through 
reform – ‘killing with kindness’ – but only if it was coupled with a strict response to illegal 
protest. If necessary, this would include the suspension of civil liberties. In one respect, there 
was nothing novel about this: through most of the nineteenth century, ‘Coercion Acts’ 
suspended ordinary rights of criminal process, such as habeas corpus and trial by jury, for 
fixed periods of six months to a year.102 The Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act 1887 
marked an important departure from the practice, as it imposed ‘permanent coercion’ for an 
indefinite period.103 In Salisbury’s estimation, at least twenty years of repression would be 
needed before the Irish would understand that illegal protest would produce no gains. This, 
for many Liberals, made it clear that a choice had to be made between home rule and the 
permanent suspension of civil liberties. The guarantees of clause 4(5), especially in respect of 
due process and equal protection, cast the Liberal party as the party of individual freedom and 
constitutional rights. Indeed, to use Gladstone’s rhetoric, the liberties of the subject would be 
restored under the ‘Magna Charta for Ireland’. 104  
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around one each year. See also Charles Townshend, Political Violence in 
Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1848, Oxford, 1983; Lewis Perry Curtis, Coercion 
and Conciliation in Ireland 1880-1892: A Study in Conservative Unionism, Princeton, 1963, 
ch. X.  
103 50 & 51 Vict., c. 20; see Curtis, ibid., 179-186. 
104 See e.g. Gladstone in his opening speech on the 1886 bill: ‘something must be done, 
something is imperatively demanded from us to restore to Ireland the first conditions of civil 
life—the free course of law, the liberty of every individual in the exercise of every legal right, 
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If this was the reason for including the clause in the bill, the government failed to 
explain it to parliament or the wider public. Home rule was frequently presented as the 
alternative to coercion, but the link to the clause was not made. In Gladstone’s speeches 
introducing the bill and later at the start of the second reading, he scarcely referred to the 
clause, except in reference to the Magna Charta. Neither did Bryce nor the law officers, nor 
any other prominent Liberals or sympathetic newspapers. Ultimately, it was Canon 
McDermott’s assessment in 1873 that proved correct: the inclusion of the clause did not 
produce any clear tactical gains. The final division in the commons followed party lines that 
were drawn well before the bill was introduced, and the overwhelming vote in the lords 
against the bill suggests that the clause also had no effect on it. Even as a rallying point for 
Liberals, it had little impact. Neither the Liberal government that introduced the third and 
fourth home rule bills of 1912105 nor the coalition government of 1920106 bothered to include 
anything corresponding to the rights to due process, equal protection or just compensation in 
                                                                                                                                                        
the confidence of the people in the law, and their sympathy with the law, apart from which no 
country can be called, in the full sense of the word, a civilized country, nor can there be given 
to that country the blessings which it is the object of civilized society to attain’. 
Parliamentary Debates, series 3, vol. 304, cols. 1044-45, 8 April 1886 (House of Commons). 
For other contemporary writers, see Thomas A. Dickson, An Irish Policy for a Liberal 
Government, Committee on Irish Affairs Paper No. 4, London, 1885; Bryce, ‘How We 
Became Home Rulers’; Lord Thring, ‘Ireland’s Alternatives’, in James Bryce, ed., Handbook 
of Home Rule, London 1887, 194-213, and Parry, ‘The Home Rule Crisis’.  
105 Enacted as the Government of Ireland Act 1914.  
106 Enacted as the Government of Ireland Act 1920. The government initially resisted but 
then accepted an amendment adding the just compensation clause to section 5, which was a 
provision on religious discrimination: see Allen, Right to Property, 41-43. 
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either bill. Hence, even for the Liberals, the clause did not capture the imagination of its 
membership, and it never seemed to have a function beyond the narrow tactical purpose. 
Civil liberties and constitutional rights may have been important, but enforcing them through 
judicial review of legislation did not become part of a broader vision of the relationship 
between the state and the individual. Its tactical value was not proven, and without that, even 
the Liberal governments could see no reason to revive it.  
V THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 
 
The opposition argued, as Bryce did in ‘Alternative Politics’, that the ‘police difficulty’ 
would make a rights clause ineffective. This was probably all that the opposition MPs, 
especially the Unionists, needed to say about the clause to satisfy their supporters. Jaconelli, 
writing in 1990, observed that ‘no conceivable formulation of such guarantees would ever 
prove satisfactory’ to the opponents of home rule; McDermott had predicted the same in 
1873.107 Nevertheless, the opposition also worked hard to demonstrate that the rights would 
not safeguard minorities, even without the ‘police difficulty’. Its main line of attack was on 
the framing of the rights. The opposition claimed that the government deliberately expressed 
the rights in a way that would not impose a real restraint on the legislature. Two points were 
made. First, a number of opposition MPs argued that clause 4(5) contained rights that, in the 
United States, had relatively little impact on the legislature.108 As noted above, Maine and 
Dicey saw the contracts clause, rather than the due process clause, as the most significant 
                                                 
107 Jaconelli, ‘Human Rights’, 181; on McDermott, see text accompanying n. 53; see also 
Keane, ‘Fundamental Rights’. 
108 Jaconelli, ibid., 188-189; Keane, ibid., 29-33. 
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provision in restricting legislatures.109 In A Leap in the Dark, Dicey raised this apparent 
selectivity as evidence that the new legislature would be able to target landlords.110 He also 
pointed out that the bill had not included the American prohibitions on acts of indemnity and 
ex post facto laws, with the result that the Irish legislature could pass laws protecting public 
officials from an abuse of power.111 A number of members picked up on these points in 
parliament, arguing that the omissions were deliberate and showed that the government was 
not interested in protecting minorities.112 In response, Bryce said that ‘the sub-section is 
amply sufficient, taken along with the others, to cover every difficulty that has been 
raised’.113 Nevertheless, Dunbar Barton, an Ulster Unionist, said it was an ‘absolute fraud’ 
and the bill would be better without it.114 A.J. Balfour argued that it was nothing more than a 
trick intended to persuade the English supporters of loyalists into believing that ‘they were 
not betraying the interests of those in Ireland who had trusted them’.115 
                                                 
109 Above, text accompanying n. 28-30. 
 
110 Dicey, A Leap in the Dark, 89-92. 
111 Ibid., 87-89.  
112 See Edward Carson: the clause was ‘a mere paper section’: Parliamentary Debates, series 
4, vol. 13, col. 378, 6 June 1893 (House of Commons). See also Churchill, Parliamentary 
Debates, series 4, vol. 13, cols. 1089-90, 15 June 1893 (House of Commons); Mowbray, 
Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, col. 1094, 15 June 1893 (House of Commons). 
113 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, cols. 1107-08, 15 June 1893 (House of 
Commons). See also the attorney general, at Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, col. 
1103, 15 June 1893 (House of Commons). 
114 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, col. 1142, 15 June 1893 (House of Commons); 
see also Dunbar Barton,  delete or complete 
115 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, col. 1145, 15 June 1893 (House of Commons).  
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As a related point, Members also argued that the rights to ‘due process of law’ and the 
‘equal protection of the laws’ were weak because their scope depended entirely on content of 
laws enacted by the legislature.116 Similarly, the takings guarantee would be meaningless 
without some objective standard to determine whether compensation was ‘just’.117 This led to 
an interesting debate on the nature and proof of constitutional rights, as the government 
insisted that the clause embodied principles that were already recognized, but that would now 
be justiciable. The attorney general, Charles Russell, stated that ‘due process of law is where 
the process of law follows settled principles of judicial procedure, or where such process 
follows sound precedent applicable to the subject-matter and the circumstances affecting 
it’.118 Hence, the Irish legislature could enact a law making sheep-stealing a capital offence 
punishable by death, but not if it allowed a ‘Stipendiary Magistrate, or any inferior 
functionary of that kind’ to try the case and pass the sentence, ‘because it would not be 
following settled, sound precedent applicable to the subject-matter there dealt with’. 119 
Similarly, it could not simply deem that ‘every occupier in Ireland should be the owner of the 
fee-simple of the land he occupied’ because there would be ‘no judicial machinery or 
                                                 
116 See Macartney, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 10, col. 1697, 6 April 1893 (House of 
Commons); Murrary, correct? Parliamentary Debates, vol. 11, col. 168-169, 12 April 1893 
(House of Commons); Carson, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 11, cols. 836-837, 20 April 1893 
(House of Commons); Selborne, Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 17, col. 374, 7 Sept. 
1893 (House of Lords). 
117 See e.g. Cranborne, Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, col. 1372, 19 June 1893 
(House of Commons). 
118 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, 15 June 1893 vol. 13, col. 1116 (House of Commons). 
119 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, 15 June 1893 vol. 13, col. 1116 (House of Commons). 
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proceeding at all’.120 Finally, the attorney general suggested that the legislature could pass a 
law suspending habeas corpus, but only in cases where, ‘according to established precedent, 
there was an emergency or a state of circumstances justifying the action’.121 Similarly, the 
solicitor general argued that the meaning of ‘just compensation’ would be governed by ‘what 
the Irish and English laws at the present time think to be just’, and that Irish Acts would be 
void if they infringed ‘the fundamental laws of justice in granting compensation’.122 
 The law officers deliberately said very little on the sources or nature of precedent. In 
response, Dunbar Barton challenged the use of precedent: ‘In no country had historical 
precedents been used in deciding legal questions; and if they could be used there would be 
nothing to prevent the Irish Legislature following the coercive policy of the present 
Government in past years’.123 He did not raise the Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act 
1887, but it provided a good example of the difficulty in using legislation as precedent: not 
only did it intrude on basic liberties, but there was nothing in the statute itself that would have 
explained why ministers and MPs thought it necessary to enact the bill or their views on its 
                                                 
120 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, 15 June 1893 vol. 13, col. 1116 (House of Commons). 
121 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, 15 June 1893 vol. 13, col. 1116 (House of Commons); 
see also the solicitor general, Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, cols. 1111-12, 15 June 
1893 (House of Commons).  
122 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 11, col. 112, 11 April 1893 (House of Commons).  
123 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, cols. 1209-10, 16 June 1893 (House of 
Commons). See Greer, ‘Crime, justice and legal literature’, 241-268: prior to 1893, there 
would have been around one bill annually. 
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impact on constitutional rights.124 The preamble stated only that it was intended ‘to make 
better provision for the prevention and punishment of Crime in Ireland, and for other 
purposes relating thereto’.125 This provided no information on the reasons for coercion, let 
alone the departure from the practice of limiting coercion legislation to fixed periods. George 
Wyndham made a similar point about precedent and land reform. He referred to the Land 
Law (Ireland) Act 1881 and the Land Law (Ireland) Act 1887 as proof that ‘The Imperial 
Parliament was every day engaged in passing laws, extinguishing the rights of property in a 
manner some believed to be due and others believed to be undue’.126  
In parliament, the concern over the use and abuse of ‘historical precedent’ led to 
numerous proposals for amendments. Wyndham, for example, argued that the Irish 
legislature should be restricted to laws ‘giving not less security than is given by the common 
law, or by any Act of Parliament varying the common law’.127 (He did not explain how he 
would reconcile this with the Land Law Acts.) Hobhouse would have changed ‘just 
compensation’ to ‘such compensation as he [the owner] is at present by law entitled to’.128 In 
response, the attorney general observed that land expropriation laws had evolved over the 
                                                 
124 Dicey raised the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 25, s.1, as an 
example of the danger of relying on precedent, as it took away the right to a jury trial for 
some crimes: A Leap in the Dark, 86 n2.  
125 50 & 51 Vict., c. 20. 
126 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, 15 June 1893 vol. 13, col. 1129 (House of Commons). 
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fifty years prior to the bill and would continue to do so in response to changing circumstances 
and moral standards. The proposed amendments could not be accepted because the Irish 
legislature would require a similar power to adjust Irish law over time.129 The Conservative 
Gerald Balfour then asked for a more general amendment, so as to bar the legislature from 
enacting laws infringing due process of law ‘in accordance with the settled principles and 
precedents of judicial procedure, unalterable save by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom’.130 The attorney general stated that the amendment would add nothing to the bill, 
but ultimately the government agreed to accept it. However, it insisted that the reference to 
alteration by parliament should be dropped, in order to avoid giving ‘these settled principles 
and precedent a stereotyped character’.131 The attorney general also insisted that the reference 
to ‘judicial procedure’ should be omitted, again citing the danger of stereotyping the 
clause.132 The government said that the amendment did nothing to change the meaning of the 
clause, but nonetheless it was controversial: ninety-five Liberals joined the IPP in voting 
against it.133 It may seem odd that they would break with their leadership over an apparently 
meaningless amendment, but it sent the signal that they would not accept any further changes. 
The possibility of relying on the American cases was also raised. James Bryce said, in 
relation to the interpretation of ‘due process of law’, that ‘We are dealing with words which 
have received in the Courts of the United States a perfectly clear, perfectly uniform, perfectly 
                                                 
129 Ibid., cols. 1367-68. 
130 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, cols. 1198-1201, 16 June 1893 (House of 
Commons) (emphasis added). 
131 Ibid., cols. 1201-02ff. 
132 Ibid., col. 1202. See also Bryce, ibid., col. 1204. 
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definite, and perfectly unambiguous construction. . . . a large body of interpretation has been 
accumulated in their Courts [i.e. State courts] as well as in the Federal Courts, leaving the 
question quite unambiguous’.134 This line of argument was also rejected by the opposition, as 
some MPs questioned whether the American cases would provide the certainty that Bryce 
suggested.135 Others stated that the American cases were irrelevant, because they decided in a 
system that was based on constitutional supremacy rather than parliamentary supremacy.136 
It is difficult to say how closely Dunbar Barton, or the other MPs, engaged with the 
idea of rights or the use of historical precedent to establish rights. Jaconelli is correct in 
identifying their determination to reject any measure or argument that might have supported 
home rule.137 Moreover, as shown below, the three main parties reversed their positions on 
these issues in 1912: the Liberal government did not incorporate a rights clause in the home 
rule bill, only for the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists to insist that it should have done 
so. The common element, in both 1893 and 1912, was the determination to show that nothing 
could make home rule safe for the minority. Nevertheless, it does seem contradictory that, in 
1893, the opposition dismissed the clause on the basis that only parliament could protect the 
minority, but parliament’s own precedents would undermine any judicial safeguards. 
Ultimately, for the opposition, the superiority of parliament (as opposed to its supremacy) in 
                                                 
134 Parliamentary Debates, series 4, vol. 13, cols. 1154-55, 15 June 1893 (House of 
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the protection of minorities did not lie in its methods of reasoning or choice of precedent, 
assuming that these could be identified and described, but in its composition and power. 
Their trust lay in factors such as the qualifications to vote or stand in an election, the 
distribution of seats, the rules and conventions governing the conduct of its business, the 
engagement of the electorate, the manner in which public opinion was formed, and especially 
the balance of power between competing interest groups. For the opposition, this meant that 
even if an Irish legislature followed parliament’s rules and procedures for electing 
representatives and enacting law, only parliament could be trusted to balance the interests of 
the Protestant minority against the Catholic majority. Of course, for the IPP, the opposite was 
the case: only an Irish legislature could be trusted to balance the interests of all groups. In the 
end, the parliamentary debates touched on the scholarly discussion of the impact of 
entrenching rights, but without engaging with it closely. 
 
VI THE LEGACY OF THE DEBATES 
 
As stated in the Introduction, the debates had limited impact on development of human rights 
in Britain and the wider empire. To be sure, the British did not oppose all demands for bills of 
rights in the colonies. Indeed, the right to just compensation was included in the Government 
of Ireland Act 1920, although only as an amendment that was initially resisted by the 
government.138 At the insistence of the Irish, the Anglo-Irish treaty and the Irish Free State 
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Act included a bill of rights; however, the provisions were not based on the 1893 bill but 
rather on American and European models.139 In the colonies, interest was growing in bills of 
rights, but it does not appear that the 1893 bill provided the inspiration.140 In Australia, a 
proposal to add a due process clause to the constitution was defeated in the convention 
debates of 1898. Two main arguments were employed against the clause: first, state 
legislatures were the guarantors of rights and had never intruded on them in the past; and, 
paradoxically, the fourteenth amendment indicated that the clause could prevent states from 
discriminating against the non-white population.141 Elsewhere, the Indian National Congress 
put the protection of fundamental rights at the heart of its constitutional proposals of 1895,142 
                                                 
139 McCrudden, ‘Using Comparative Constitutionalism’, 327-330; Arthur Berriedale Keith, 
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1925143 and 1928,144 but there is no evidence that the drafters drew on the 1893 debates. The 
British view remained one of scepticism, until well after world war two. For example, in 
1934, the parliamentary joint committee on Indian constitutional reform rejected calls for 
incorporating a declaration of rights in the Government of India Bill 1935, in terms that 
would have been familiar to those who participated in the 1893 debates:  
. . . either the declaration of rights is of so abstract a nature that it has no legal effect 
of any kind, or its legal effect will be to impose an embarrassing restriction on the 
powers of the Legislature and to create a grave risk that a large number of laws may 
be declared invalid by the Courts because inconsistent with one or another of the 
rights so declared.145 
It seemed that there was no possibility of finding language that would place a bill of rights 
somewhere between having ‘no legal effect’ and creating a ‘grave risk’ to legislative power.  
As in 1893, the British did not reject arguments that minorities needed safeguards, but they 
did reject arguments that the courts could provide that protection. 
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Why did the arguments of the sceptics prevail so thoroughly, especially given that the 
clause survived the close scrutiny of the committee stage and the bill was passed by the 
commons? As suggested above, a key factor was the instrumental nature of the debate: much 
of the discussion on nature and impact of a bill of rights was lost in the crossfire over home 
rule. Questions were asked and answers were given, but there was no real commitment to the 
positions that were taken. For example, in the commons, the opposition’s frequent motions 
for amendments might suggest that it had a genuine interest in making a bill of rights 
effective. However, the focus was always on defeating home rule.146 Indeed, amendments 
were proposed with such frequency that IPP members tried to dissuade government ministers 
from debating them. In their view, the government would only give credibility to the idea that 
home rule would jeopardize minorities. Thomas Sexton, an IPP member, stated that the 
government ‘are allowing the country to be misled into the belief that these Amendments are 
moved for the purpose of improving the Bill’.147 
The emphasis on the tactical advantages of raising or dismissing bills of rights 
became even more obvious in the debate on the third home rule bill. For example, in relation 
to the first home rule bill, Dicey started from what would become a fairly standard critique of 
justiciable rights. In England’s Case Against Home Rule (1886), he argued that parliament 
was much better placed to protect minorities.148 However, in A Fool’s Paradise: Being a 
Constitutionalist's Criticism on the Home Rule Bill of 1912, he argued that there would be 
circumstances in which Ulster unionists could ignore the 1912 bill if it were enacted and 
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came into force.149 Indeed, in the debates on the 1912 bill, there was a ‘remarkable reversal of 
roles’, as members on both sides abandoned views taken in 1893.150 The Liberals did not 
include provisions corresponding to clause 4(5) in the 1912 bill, only for the Conservatives to 
propose an amendment to incorporate it. The home rule opponents mounted a spirited attack 
on the government for rejecting the amendment, and the Liberals defended their position with 
vigour. Sir John Simon, the solicitor general, stated that the rights should not be incorporated 
because they were not ‘reasonably susceptible of judicial determination’, especially with the 
qualification that they should be interpreted ‘in accordance with the settled principles and 
precedents’.151 The prime minister, H.H. Asquith, criticized the amendment in a speech that 
could have been given by the opposition in 1893; in his view, the clause was  
full of ambiguity abounding in pitfall and certainly provocative of every kind of 
frivolous litigation. Look at the adjectives used. What are "settled principles?" What 
is "equal protection of the laws"? What is "just compensation?" . . . They are all really 
matters of opinion, bias, or inclination and judgment which cannot be acted on under 
anything like settled rules of law as to whether or not in any particular case equality or 
fairness, some abstract, some probably very-varying standard of quality or fairness 
has or has not been observed. I cannot imagine any subject in which unnecessary and 
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gratuitous litigation would be more readily-invited, or in regard to which the decisions 
of the tribunals would be received with less general respect and authority.152 
He then attacked the opposition for its inconsistency in proposing the amendment. 
Predictably, the opposition retorted that it was in fact the Liberals who were inconsistent, 
citing the earlier speeches of Gladstone, Russell and Rigby to prove their point.153 In 1893, 
the opposition argued that the inclusion of the clause was evidence of bad faith on the part of 
the government, but now it was the refusal to include the clause established bad faith.154 
Plainly, the Liberals had lost enthusiasm for entrenched rights, but that may have been simply 
because 1893 demonstrated that there were no political gains from putting them forward.   
Arguably, the Liberal position was not merely tactical, as developments since 1893 
made the addition of a due process more difficult to defend. Asquith noted that it had been 
omitted from the new constitutions of Australia and South Africa. Hence, the inclusion of the 
clause would be taken as admission that new legislature was less deserving of trust than the 
local and national legislatures of the dominions.155 It is also apparent that the American 
experience had some impact on the Liberals. The bill was introduced to parliament in April 
1912, several years into Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign against the judicial obstruction of 
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social reforms.156 Roosevelt was particularly exercised by the supreme court’s judgment in 
Lochner v New York, where it held that a state law imposing the eight hour day in bakeries 
was contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.157 John Ward, a Liberal 
trade unionist, argued that the American cases demonstrated that the clause could be used to 
block legislation intended to improve conditions for labourers.158 Asquith and Ronald Munro-
Ferguson made the more general point that Roosevelt’s campaign highlighted the risks and 
controversies that could arise from the inclusion of the clause.159  
These arguments had little impact on the opposition. Indeed, it is hard to believe that 
the Conservatives or Unionists saw any real value in the clause, despite the arguments that 
they now made in its favour. Edward Carson, for example, attacked the clause in 1893, only 
to urge the government to incorporate it in the 1912 bill.160 Moreover, the focus on home rule 
meant that neither party (nor the rising Labour party) looked beyond the Irish situation during 
the debate on rights, or after. To be sure, there were signs that the American experience was 
beginning to influence constitutional thinking in Britain and empire. Nevertheless, the 
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position that members took on the clause depended entirely on their position on home rule; 
the question of bills of rights did not seem to have meaning in any other context. Once the 
debates finished, attention quickly dropped, and there was no attempt to gather support for or 
against bills of rights. The sceptics won because there was no sustained, coherent argument 
made in favour of bills of rights.   
VII CONCLUSIONS 
 
What might have happened if the lords passed the 1893 bill and the clause had come into 
force? This question, of course, imagines a world in which the resistance to home rule was 
nowhere near as great as it was, or at least where the Parliament Act 1911 was already in 
force. It also requires us to imagine what the new legislature would have done, especially in 
relation to the contentious issues of land reform and education, and whether it would have felt 
it necessary to impose coercion. If the Irish courts and privy council had followed the 
American cases, as Bryce suggested, would they have produced an Irish version of the 
Lochner jurisprudence of the supreme court of the United States?161 There is some evidence 
that the privy council would have been so inclined, as it struck down progressive legislation 
in Canada over the following decades.162 On the other hand, if we look to the earlier period, 
the opinions given on the Boothby case and the enactment of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 
1865 suggest that the privy council and Irish courts would have been reluctant to use the 
                                                 
161 Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905). 
162 Contemporary critics include John Willis, ‘Administrative Law and the British North 
America Act’, 53 Harvard Law Review (1939), 251 and Bora Laskin, ‘”Peace, Order and 
Good Government” Re-examined’, 25 Canadian Bar Review (1947), 1054. 
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clause against the legislature. Indeed, Irish judges tended to take a formal, restrictive view of 
the rights protected under the Irish Free State Act; perhaps the judges would have done the 
same if the 1893 bill had come into force.  
We might also ask questions about the process: for example, would the prospects for 
rights in Ireland and elsewhere have been different if Gladstone had not been so secretive in 
drafting the two homes rule bills? Or if many of the leading figures had not seen the rights 
clauses as little more than a concession that might win them some support, especially as they 
miscalculated the effect that it would have? Or, if constitutional scholars had separated the 
idea of a bill of rights from home rule for Ireland, would it have been the subject of a more 
searching public discussion, perhaps leading to the growth of a solid constituency that would 
have carried forward the idea of rights for Ireland or the empire? Plainly, any speculation 
could only take place against a background of many different assumptions. In the end, 
however, we are only left with the impression that the 1893 bill was not so much ahead of its 
time, as altogether out of its time.  
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